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The Apportionment Formula under 
the European Proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
In this article, the author discusses the 
sharing mechanism suggested in the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base proposal, 
which employs three equally-weighted factors: 
assets, labour and sales. The author argues that 
although there is no doubt that the transfer 
pricing regime should be replaced by a more 
effective system, designing an adequate 
method requires taking into consideration 
the unique characteristics of the European 
Union and the experience with formulary 
apportionment in other states.  
1.  Introduction
In 2001, the European Commission, in its report Company 
Taxation in the Internal Market, argued that the coexis-
tence of 15 different tax systems (now 28) is causing a sig-
nificant number of tax obstacles to the correct function-
ing of the internal market.1 Amongst them, the report 
alluded to the difficulties encountered in using transfer 
pricing methods to locate a company’s profits, a valuation 
system that not only hinders cross-border economic activ-
ity but also generates inefficiencies in terms of decisions 
regarding the location of a business and the risk of aggres-
sive tax planning. 
The report proposed implementation of a Common Con-
solidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which would 
mean the introduction of a single set of rules to calculate 
the tax base of corporate groups and distribute the base 
among EU Member States.2 In order to make such a dis-
tribution, the CCCTB proposal needs to define a sharing 
mechanism. 
Due to the implications of the proposal, both from a polit-
ical and economic perspective, the potential mechanism 
for sharing the CCCTB has traditionally been one of the 
most sensitive issues of the proposal. Because such a mech-
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1. See European Commission, Staff Working Paper, Company Taxation 
in the Internal Market, COM(2001) 582 final (23 Oct. 2001), SEC(2001) 
1681, EU Law IBFD.
2. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base, COM(2016) 683 final (25 Oct. 2016), EU Law IBFD [here-
inafter CCCTB proposal]. This document was launched at the same 
time as the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate 
Tax Base, COM(2016) 685 final (25 Oct. 2016), EU Law IBFD [hereinaf-
ter CCTB proposal], as part of a dual-stage strategy. The idea is to first 
implement a common set of rules for calculating corporate tax bases 
and defer consolidation until a second stage.
anism would determine the capacity of each EU Member 
State to tax the profits of a group, it will be difficult to 
achieve consensus on this point. The European institu-
tions, aware of this issue, have repeatedly insisted that the 
sharing mechanism must be fair, equitable, neutral and 
not susceptible to manipulation. 
The first round of debates about the sharing mechanism 
made a basic distinction between three different alterna-
tives: (i) a macro approach; (ii) a micro approach based 
on value added; and (iii) an approach based on an appor-
tionment formula. Although the original studies pointed 
to the conclusion that each alternative had advantages 
and disadvantages, the European Commission suggested 
taking into consideration the experiences of the United 
States and Canada, two countries where apportionment 
formulas have been successfully used for many years to 
distribute the profits of a company among states. Since 
then, all the debates held by the European institutions 
have focused on the design of an apportionment formula.
2.  The Apportionment Formula under the 
CCCTB Proposal
2.1.  Introductory remarks
The sharing mechanism suggested in the CCCTB pro-
posal consists in a three-factor formula, each with the 
same weight: assets, labour (including wages and number 
of employees) and sales by destination. This approach uses, 
as the starting point, the “Massachusetts formula” that has 
been applied in the United States since 1950, which is also 
based on the employment of three factors to locate a com-
pany’s income: assets, wages and sales.3 
From a comparative perspective, the apportionment 
formula suggested in the CCCTB proposal is different 
from the US model in two respects. The first relates to 
the composition of the labour factor. Unlike the Massa-
chusetts formula, which only includes wages paid by the 
group, the European proposal also takes into consider-
ation the number of employees. This must be included in 
the formula at the same weight as wages.4 In this way, the 
European Commission wants to ensure that wage differ-
3. These factors are regarded as reasonable approximations to the profit 
that the group obtains in a certain territory, taking into consideration 
both the demand for the group’s goods and services in that state (sales 
by destination) and the production activity developed therein (assets 
and labour). 
4. As the total weight given to each factor (including the labour factor) is 
one third, both wages and the number of employees have a weight of 
1/6 in the apportionment formula (0.5 x 1/3 = 1/6).
European Union Ángel Sánchez Sánchez*
230 EUroPEAn TAxATIon June 2018 © IBFD
Exported / Printed on 26 Nov. 2018 by IBFD.
ences amongst EU Member States do not distort the dis-
tribution process of corporate tax bases.
The second difference between the US and European 
models is related to the weight of the factors included 
in the formula. As opposed to the US model, the Euro-
pean proposal does not recommend that EU Member 
States adopt a three-factor formula, each with the same 
weight, but compels them to do so without contemplat-
ing any kind of deviation. The grounds for this rule seem 
to be connected with the lessons that the US experience 
itself taught. In this sense, there is strong evidence that, 
when the weight of the factors can be modified unilater-
ally, states have an incentive to deviate from the initially 
suggested formula.5 As a result of this deviation process, 
double taxation and non-taxation problems arise. 
Focusing attention on the European context, the Intro-
duction to the CCCTB proposal points out that: 
the CCCTB features as an effective tool for attributing income 
to where the value is created, through a formula based on three 
equally weighted factors (i.e. assets, labour, and sales). Since 
these factors are attached to where a company earns its profits, 
they are more resilient to aggressive tax planning practices than 
the widespread transfer pricing methods for allocating profit. 
According to this provision, one of the main objectives 
of the European proposal seems to be to replace trans-
fer pricing with a new system for assigning corporate 
profits to the territories where they have been earned. 
This purpose is closely related to the strategies in the 
fight against aggressive tax planning being pursued by 
the European institutions.
As noted in section 1., the analytical study carried out by 
the European Commission at the end of 1990 brought to 
light the weaknesses of transfer pricing as a system for 
allocating corporate profits. Amongst its most important 
f laws, the Commission established a strong link between 
the use of transfer pricing methods and the risk of tax 
evasion. In respect of this point, it is important to high-
light that the transfer pricing system was also originally 
designed for the purpose of making an optimal assign-
ment of a company’s profits to the territories where they 
were effectively earned. In fact, it is technically a perfect 
method to reach that objective. The problem is that, in 
recent years, the search by companies for tax savings 
has unleashed a growing tendency to use this system in 
a fraudulent way. More specifically, the ease of transfer 
pricing manipulation has provided cross-border compan-
ies and groups with ample room to carry out aggressive 
tax planning strategies that lessen the capacity of trans-
fer pricing methods to achieve their original objectives.
Initially, it is to be expected that the mere substitution of 
the transfer pricing system for an apportionment formula 
will reduce the existing incentives to engage in aggressive 
tax planning, since the three chosen factors are closely 
5. A brief historical overview of the US experience with formulary appor-
tionment can be found in W. Hellerstein & Ch. E. McLure Jr, The Euro-
pean Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU 
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States, Intl. Tax and Public 
Finance 11, pp. 207-208 (2004).
linked to the place where the company develops its eco-
nomic activity. The implementation of a formula, however, 
will not put an end to the problem of profit shifting in a 
definitive way. This is mainly because these factors are 
potentially subject to manipulation, to a greater or a lesser 
extent (as currently happens with transfer pricing). This 
circumstance has led Kiesewetter, Steigenberger & Sitier 
(2014) to assert that unitary taxation (i.e. the employ-
ment of an apportionment formula to allocate corporate 
tax bases) “creates new opportunities for cross-border tax 
planning without destroying the old opportunities”.6 
The European institutions are aware that, after the 
approval of the CCCTB Directive, there will still be room 
for manipulation, such that the risk of profit shifting will 
continue to exist. For this reason, the proposal includes a 
series of anti-abuse rules that will be analysed in the fol-
lowing sections of this article.7 
2.2.  Labour factor (wages and number of employees)
First, article 33.1 of the CCCTB proposal establishes that 
employees must be included in the labour factor of the 
company that pays their wages. Immediately after, article 
33.2 points out that employees who are formally hired 
by one entity but provide their work services under the 
control and responsibility of a different group member 
(i.e. different from the entity that pays their wages), must 
be included in the labour factor of the entity for which 
they are effectively working. This provision will only be 
applied, however, where two conditions are fulfilled at 
the same time: the situation referred to must extend for 
a minimum of three months and the affected employees 
must represent at least 5% of the payer company’s work-
force. By including such a rule in the CCCTB proposal, 
the European institutions want to prevent groups of com-
panies from manipulating the number of employees, 
and therefore the weight of the labour factor, for the 
sole purpose of benefitting from tax savings. This strat-
egy could be interesting when members of the group are 
located in countries with different levels of tax rates, so 
that the group could have an incentive to formally hire 
workers in EU Member States with lower tax rates, regard-
less of the territory in which the entity that is effectively 
going to control their work is located. 
Second, article 33.3 indicates that the labour factor not 
only includes workers who are directly hired by the group, 
but also people who carry out tasks substantially similar, 
or even identical, to those that are assigned to hired 
employees. With this provision, the CCCTB proposal 
tries to avoid the use of subcontracting as a mechanism 
to reduce the weight of the labour factor in countries with 
higher tax rates. Similar to what happens with the number 
of employees, the lack of such a rule would leave room for 
6. D. Kiesewetter, T. Steigenberger & M. Sitier, Can formula apportionment 
really prevent multinational enterprises from profit shifting? – the role of 
asset valuation, intragroup debt, and leases, Quantitative Tax Research - 
Arqus Discussion Papers 175, p. 27 (2014).
7. A similar study can be found in K. Boucher, Multistate Corporate 
Tax-Saving Strategies, 12 J. St. Tax’n 4, pp. 23-57 (1984) and K. Boucher 
& R. Taylor, State tax studies can benefit corporate taxpayers, 5 J. St. Tax’n 
4, pp. 307-327 (1987). 
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tax abuse on the part of cross-border groups. Instead of 
directly carrying out their economic activity, for example, 
groups could have an incentive to hire the services of a 
temporary employment company that engages in such 
an activity without providing anything else. That means 
that the temporary employment company would carry out 
the group’s activity but by making use of the group’s own 
inventory, intellectual property and know-how. As long 
as such a strategy is developed in a high-tax location, the 
use of subcontracting employees would allow the group 
to obtain tax savings.
As far as the wages factor is concerned, article 33.4 compels 
the inclusion in the apportionment formula, apart from 
wages in the strict sense of the word, of all costs associ-
ated with wage payments and any other kind of remuner-
ation paid as compensation for the work services provid-
ed.8 This includes costs associated with pension funds and 
social security. The choice of an extended definition helps 
to prevent the group from manipulating the labour factor 
in order to increase (or reduce) its weight in countries 
with lower (or higher) tax rates. This result could easily 
be achieved by disguising a wage payment using alterna-
tive concepts, such as: payments in kind; gifts; compen-
sation for travelling, accommodation and maintenance 
expenses; debt payments, etc.
2.3.  Assets factor
Article 34 of the CCCTB proposal indicates that the assets 
factor includes “all fixed tangible assets owned, rented or 
leased”. It can be inferred from this definition that intan-
gible assets, financial assets and inventory are not included 
in the apportionment formula, since such elements do not 
fit within the definition of “fixed assets”.9 
The practical effects of this definition are highly relevant, 
especially when taking into consideration the active fight 
against aggressive tax planning strategies being carried 
out by the European institutions. As was supported by the 
European Commission in its working document, CCCTB: 
Possible elements of the sharing mechanism, inventory can 
represent an important part of a company’s total assets, 
but it is highly mobile and, therefore, susceptible to manip-
ulation.10 For example, there could be an incentive for a 
group of companies to establish a warehouse in a state 
with low tax rates for the sole purpose of diverting part 
of its corporate tax base to that territory and, in this way, 
benefitting from tax savings. Apart from high mobility, 
financial assets usually have a high value. Such a feature 
turns them into an effective instrument for carrying out 
profit-shifting strategies. Intangible assets, in turn, not 
8. According to art. 33.3, both wages and other related costs will be 
included in the formula regardless of whether or not the people who 
receive the money are directly hired by the company.
9. Art. 4 CCCTB proposal defines fixed assets as “tangible assets acquired 
for value or created by the taxpayer and intangible assets acquired for 
value that are capable of being valued independently and that are used 
in the business for producing, maintaining or securing income for more 
than 12 months, except where their acquisition or construction cost is 
less than EUR 1,000”.
10. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, CCCTB: 
Possible elements of the sharing mechanism, European Commission 
Working Document 60 (European Commission 2007).
only share the features of financial assets (high mobility 
and value), but also raise problems concerning valuation 
and territorial assignment that invite abuse.
Regarding location issues, article 35.1 of the CCCTB pro-
posal states that a group’s assets will be assigned to the EU 
Member State where its economic owner is located. Only 
when it is not possible to identify the economic owner 
will the asset be included in the assets factor of its legal 
owner. Furthermore, the European proposal also consid-
ers the possibility of a sublease, i.e. a situation in which 
the person or company making use of the asset differs 
from the person or company that can be regarded as its 
legal or economic owner. According to the solution that 
the CCCTB proposal provides, the subleased asset must 
be allocated to the territory where the economic owner 
is located, as long as the value of that asset relative to the 
value of the entity’s total assets is more than 5%. If the lease 
operation is entered into between a company that is part 
of a fiscal group and a third entity (regardless of the posi-
tion each one assumes), the leased asset must be included 
in the assets factor of both parties.11 
In order to better comprehend these rules, it is necessary 
to take into consideration the definition of economic 
owner in article 4 of the CCTB proposal.12 According to 
this provision, the person who is to be regarded as the 
economic owner is:
the person who receives substantially all the benefits and bears 
all the risks attached to a fixed asset, regardless of whether that 
person is the legal owner. A taxpayer who has the right to pos-
sess, use and dispose of a fixed asset and bears the risk of its loss 
or destruction shall in any event be considered the economic 
owner. 
Thus, when a lease operation involves a division between 
legal and economic ownership, the following question 
must be answered: when does the formalization of a lease 
contract imply a transfer of all the risks attached to the 
asset between the lessor and the lessee?
As stated in article 4 of the International Accounting 
Standard 17 (IAS 17), related to lease operations, “A lease 
is classified as a finance lease if it transfers substantially 
all the risks and rewards incident to ownership. All other 
leases are classified as operating leases”. The key difference 
between finance and operating leases lies, therefore, in the 
transference of all risks and rewards attached to the leased 
asset between the two parties to the contract. Only in situ-
ations in which such risks and rewards are transferred to 
the lessee can the operation be defined as a finance lease 
and a distinction can be made between legal ownership 
of the asset, which will fall on the lessor, and economic 
ownership, which will fall on the lessee. It is for this reason 
that article 32.2 of the CCCTB proposal refers to the lack 
of coincidence between economic and legal ownership as 
a typical feature of finance lease contracts.
In addition to taking into consideration the existing dif-
ferences between finance and operating leases, determin-
11. In these instances, the criterion applied to value the asset will be differ-
ent and art. 35 CCCTB proposal will be reverted to. 
12. Supra n. 2.
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ing the group member to which the leased asset must be 
assigned requires making a basic distinction between two 
different situations. Firstly, when the signing parties of the 
lease contract are part of the same fiscal group, the leased 
asset must be included in the assets factor of its economic 
owner. As noted, such a condition will depend on the clas-
sification of the lease contract (finance lease or operating 
lease). In the event the contract is classified as an operat-
ing lease, the asset must be included in the apportionment 
formula of the lessor, who meets the requirements of legal 
and economic ownership. When the contract can be clas-
sified as a finance lease, the asset must be included in the 
assets factor of the lessee or economic owner. As a second 
possibility, when the lessor and the lessee are not part of 
the same fiscal group, the leased asset must be included in 
the assets factor of both the lessor and the lessee.
Without a doubt, the procedure suggested by the Euro-
pean Commission for allocating income derived from 
lease operations attempts to prevent companies from car-
rying out aggressive tax planning strategies. If the CCCTB 
proposal did not incorporate such a set of rules to confront 
abuse, each group member would include in the assets 
factor the average value of its total assets at the fiscal year-
end (i.e. the average value of all its legally owned assets). 
Under these circumstances, cross-border groups might 
have an incentive to structure their leasing arrangements 
such that the corporate tax base is shifted to states where 
the fiscal pressure is lower. 
A good example of the kind of tax planning strategy that 
groups of companies could engage in if the European pro-
posal did not make a distinction between finance and 
operating leases, would be the following: imagine that one 
entity (entity A), which is the legal owner of a machine that 
is used in the development of its economic activity, were 
part of a consolidated group and established in a high-
tax location (such as France). The fiscal group would have 
an incentive to force the exclusion of the machine from 
the assets factor of entity A. This result could easily be 
achieved through a two-stage strategy. First, the group 
would carry out an intra-group trading transaction (pur-
chase and sale between two group members), so that own-
ership of the asset would be transferred to entity B, part of 
the same group but located in a state where tax rates are 
low (Ireland, for example). Second, the buyer (entity B) and 
the seller (entity A) would enter into a finance lease con-
tract, according to which entity B (new legal owner) would 
lend the asset to entity A. As a result of this strategy, the 
machine would continue to be used in France by entity 
A (same EU Member State, same entity), but, formally, 
would be included in the assets factor of entity B, which is 
located in a different state. Consequently, a greater part of 
the group’s corporate tax base would be assigned to the EU 
Member State with lower tax rates to the detriment of the 
EU Member State where the asset is effectively being used. 
Concerning the valuation of the assets factor, article 36.5 
of the CCCTB proposal addresses the possibility of one 
entity selling a fixed asset to a different member of the 
same group and, afterwards, selling the asset to a third 
person or entity (i.e. to a person or entity not included in 
the fiscal group). As long as the sale to the third party is 
carried out in the same tax year as the internal transaction 
or in the subsequent year, the anti-abuse rule included 
in article 36.5 of the CCCTB proposal will be applied. 
According to this rule, the asset must be included in the 
assets factor of the company that assumed the role of being 
the seller company within the framework of the internal 
transaction (i.e. it must be included in the assets factor of 
the previous owner), unless the fiscal group demonstrates 
that the internal transaction was justified by commercial 
reasons.
This legal provision tries to prevent groups of companies 
from carrying out tax savings strategies, such as the fol-
lowing: entity A, part of a fiscal group and located in a state 
where tax rates are high, is the legal owner of a machine 
that it wishes to sell out of the group. If the market price 
were higher than the fiscal value of the machine, the sale 
to a third party would mean a profit to the seller company. 
In a normal situation, that profit would increase the cor-
porate tax base of the group and would be shared among 
the countries where its economic activity is developed, 
according to the apportionment formula. If the CCCTB 
proposal did not establish a special rule, the group would 
have incentives to force an internal transaction for the 
sole purpose of transferring ownership of the machine to 
another company within the same group that is located in 
an EU Member State where fiscal pressure is lower. Sub-
sequently, the new legal owner of the machine would sell 
it to the third party for the desired price. As a result of 
this strategy, the weight of the assets factor in the state 
with lower tax rates would increase and a greater part of 
the group’s corporate tax base would be assigned to that 
territory.
2.4.  Sales factor
The CCCTB proposal opts for a strict definition of the 
sales factor in order to guarantee that only those earnings 
deriving from the ordinary economic activity are included 
in the apportionment formula. This implies leaving out 
of the formula other kinds of highly mobile earnings of a 
different origin and a greater potential for aggressive tax 
planning, such as dividends and royalties.
Article 37.3 of the proposal also excludes from the appor-
tionment formula earnings from internal or intra-group 
transactions. While dividends, royalties and earnings of a 
similar nature are excluded from the formula due to their 
mobile nature, there are even greater reasons for exclud-
ing the results of internal transactions. On the one hand, 
internal transactions do not increase the group’s overall 
profits. On the other, such transactions would need to be 
valued using transfer pricing methods if included in the 
sales factor, with the result that any problems associated 
with this valuation system would reappear. Given that 
the main objective of the CCCTB is to substitute a new 
method of distributing a company’s profits among EU 
Member States for the transfer pricing system, this result 
would be unacceptable.
Concerning the location of sales, article 38.1 of the 
CCCTB proposal states that earnings deriving from sales 
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of goods and services must be included in the sales factor 
of the entity that is located in the Member State where the 
goods are ultimately transported or, in respect of services, 
in the Member State where the service is effectively pro-
vided. The European Commission seems to opt, in this 
way, for the sales by destination criterion. Complement-
ing this provision, article 38.4 considers the possibility 
of a fiscal group having no physical presence in the state 
where the purchaser of the company’s goods or services is 
located (either through an affiliated company or a PE), in 
which scenario sales must be included in the apportion-
ment formula of all group members in proportion to the 
other factors. Contrary to initial appearances, the author 
considers that article 38.4 of the CCCTB proposal is not 
an anti-abuse rule, but only a technical provision that tries 
to resolve situations in which sales take place in an EU 
Member State that lacks the necessary competence to tax 
the group’s profits.
From a comparative perspective, the solution adopted by 
US law to address these situations consists in the applic-
ation of the throwback rule, according to which sales to 
those territories where the group does not have suffi-
cient nexus are reallocated to the state where the seller or 
service provider is located. In these circumstances, there-
fore, sales profits are not taxed in the state where the pur-
chaser resides (state of destination), but in the state of 
origin.13 Contrary to what happens in the United States, 
the CCCTB proposal does not assign these kinds of sales 
to the state of origin, but proportionally to all EU Member 
States where the group has a significant presence for tax 
purposes. This rule, traditionally known as the spread 
throwback rule, resolves certain doubts that arose under 
the US model in specific situations (for example, in the 
event of drop shipping).14 
3.  The Proposal’s Weaknesses 
As the European Commission has pointed out, under an 
apportionment formula, the group’s total tax burden does 
not depend on its specific volume of profit, but on the 
presence of the three factors in each EU Member State. 
This fact turns the formula into an effective method of 
eliminating (or, at least, significantly reducing) a com-
pany’s incentive to shift profits to low-tax locations.15 As 
some experts have warned, however, the effective imple-
mentation of the CCCTB proposal will not completely 
eliminate the problem of aggressive tax planning in the 
EU context. 
13. As an alternative, some US states have adopted the “throwout rule”. The 
difference between the throwout and throwback rule is that, when sales 
are destined for a state where the group has no physical presence, earn-
ings deriving from such sales are not taken into consideration in apply-
ing the apportionment formula. Therefore, such earnings are excluded 
both from the numerator and from the denominator of the formula.
14. “Drop shipping” can be defined as a sales model, increasingly extended 
and employed by platforms such as Amazon or eBay. Under this kind of 
retail sale, the retailer does not buy and store products in its facilities, 
but simply sends shipment details to the wholesaler, who assumes the 
responsibility for sending the product to the final consumer.
15. See Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, The 
mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, European Commission Working 
Document 47 (European Commission 2006).
One of the main weaknesses of the CCCTB proposal, 
however, is that the set of rules suggested by the European 
Commission for consolidating tax bases and distributing 
them amongst EU Member States will not, at least initially, 
be compulsory for all groups that carry out cross-border 
economic activities in the European Union. As section 3. 
of the Introduction to the CCCTB proposal lays down, 
“To meet the objective of enhancing the fairness of the tax 
system in a proportionate manner, the preferred option 
for the CCCTB suggest[s] to make it compulsory only for 
a subset of firms, based on their size”. More specifically, 
the compulsory application of the CCCTB will be limited 
to those groups with a consolidated turnover above EUR 
750 million. Micro-enterprises, small and medium-sized 
companies, therefore, will be exempt from the Directive, 
although they will have the possibility of applying it vol-
untarily.16 
Such a limited scope of application will make it necessary 
to continue to apply transfer pricing methods to valuate 
at least two categories of transactions that are not covered 
by the Directive: transactions between two members of a 
fiscal group that is not obliged to apply the CCCTB Direc-
tive and has not opted to do it voluntarily and transac-
tions between one member of a fiscal group that applies 
the CCCTB Directive (whatever the reason be, obligation 
or election) and a third entity that lacks the necessary con-
ditions to be part of the same group.17 As far as the author 
is concerned, this would not only discourage European 
groups from adhering to the proposal, but might also 
encourage a variety of reorganizations (such as mergers, 
splits, purchases and sales of the company’s shares, etc.) 
with the single aim of changing the group’s composition 
and modulating the application of the Directive. Further-
more, the disadvantages of transfer pricing as an alloca-
tion method (amongst them, a high risk of tax evasion) 
will continue to create obstacles and interfere with the 
correct functioning of the internal market.
Secondly, it should be taken into consideration that all the 
factors included in the formula are, to a greater or a lesser 
extent, mobile so the decision to locate them in one state 
or another can be under a group’s control. Although the 
CCCTB proposal includes a series of anti-abuse rules in 
order to avoid manipulation of the factors, the experience 
of other countries using formulary apportionment leads 
16. According to the Introduction to the CCCTB proposal, sec. 3, “Lim-
iting the compulsory application to groups with a consolidated turn-
over above EUR 750 million serves the purpose of capturing the vast 
majority (approximately 64%) of turnover generated by groups while 
limiting the risk of including purely domestic groups. […] At the same 
time, the proposal offers those companies, for which the application 
of the CCCTB is not compulsory, the possibility to ‘opt-in’ to the 
CCCTB system. This allows for a maximum of f lexibility for SMEs and 
micro-enterprises, offering to benefit from the advantages of a CCCTB 
without making it compulsory for this set of companies”.
17. The application of the CCCTB will be compulsory for those entities 
that, amongst other requirements, belong “to a consolidated group for 
financial accounting purposes with a total consolidated group revenue 
that exceeded EUR 750 000 000 during the financial year preceding 
the relevant financial year” (art. 2 CCCTB proposal). The concept of 
“consolidated group” is defined in art. 4, point 10 CCTB proposal as 
“all entities that are fully included in consolidated financial statements 
drawn up in accordance with the International Financial Reporting 
Standards or a national financial reporting system”. 
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us to the conclusion that other means of manipulation, 
not contemplated nor resolved under the European pro-
posal, are possible. The same idea has been defended by 
Kiesewetter, Steigenberger & Sitier, who argue that imple-
mentation of a new method to allocate the profits of com-
panies for tax purposes will only imply that old strate-
gies to alter the magnitude of corporate tax bases will be 
replaced by new techniques to alter both the location and 
the weight of the apportionment factors according to the 
group’s interest.18 
Focusing on the possibilities of manipulation offered by 
the apportionment formula, the first avenue of aggres-
sive tax planning relates to the suggested rule for calcu-
lating the number of employees. Given that article 32.2 
of the CCCTB proposal provides that “The number of 
employees shall be measured at the end of the tax year”, 
groups could have an incentive to fire some workers a few 
days before the end of the tax year and hire them again 
at the beginning of the following year. As fired workers 
would not be included in the apportionment formula 
under the suggested regime, this strategy would allow the 
group to reduce the weight of the labour factor in high-tax 
locations and to benefit from the corresponding tax sav-
ings.19 Carrying out a strategy like this, however, would 
be more difficult than it seems. This is mainly because the 
rules regarding dismissal in each EU Member State are 
different. As such, the level of difficulty of firing workers, 
both from a legal and an economic perspective, depends 
on the territory where they are providing their services. 
Despite this fact, it would be advisable to include a rule 
for calculating the number of employees in order to avoid 
any attempt at manipulation.
An appropriate alternative to reach this objective would 
be to use the average number of employees during the tax 
year instead of the total number of employees at the end of 
the tax year. Accordingly, all people that have been provid-
ing their services to the group during the tax year, even if 
made redundant before 31 December, would be counted 
in determining the weight of the factor. The key element 
is that each employee should be included in the formula in 
proportion to the number of days he effectively worked for 
the group. An employee who is fired on 1 July, for example, 
would be counted as 0.5 of a worker in applying the appor-
tionment formula.20 
In relation to the sales factor, the experience of other 
countries using formulary apportionment has brought to 
light that a company’s capacity to make decisions about 
the location of sales (i.e. the company’s capacity to decide 
where they sell their goods and services) is limited. In 
18. Supra n. 6. 
19. Based on the premise that the group’s tax year coincides with the calen-
dar year, the employees that should be taken into consideration would 
be those existing on 31 Dec.
20. The same rule is suggested in the CCCTB proposal for the valuation 
of the assets factor. As stated in art. 36.2, “Where, as a result of one or 
more intra-group transactions, an individually depreciable fixed tangi-
ble asset is included in the asset factor of a group member for less than 
a tax year, the value to be taken into account shall be calculated having 
regard to the number of months that the asset was included in the asset 
factor of that group member”.
line with this idea, the sales factor has traditionally been 
regarded as the least capable of being used as a tool for 
developing aggressive tax planning strategies.21 The pos-
sibility of eliminating physical presence in the state of des-
tination and selling products and services through inter-
mediary agents, however, would lead to the potential of 
this factor being used for fiscal purposes.
Take, for example, the situation of a fiscal group that wants 
to sell its products in an EU Member State with a high rate 
of corporate income tax. If such a group had a PE in the 
state of destination, sales to that state would be included 
in the sales factor of the PE.22 Therefore, the group’s cor-
porate tax base would partially be assigned to that terri-
tory. A feasible alternative to avoid (or, at least, to reduce) 
taxation in the state where products are sold would consist 
in substituting the PE that creates a nexus between the 
group and the state of destination for agency contracts. If 
this strategy were followed, a group’s products would not 
be directly sold in that territory by a group member, but 
by one or more independent sales agents. This implies that 
the group’s products would continue to be sold in the same 
territory, such that the group would not have to renounce 
its customers, but without any physical presence.
As the suggested example demonstrates, the implementa-
tion of the CCCTB will not prevent groups of companies 
from making use of allusive strategies in order to reduce 
the weight of the sales factor in the state of destination, 
something that could be interesting when customers are 
resident in high-tax locations. Apart from considering 
this risk and adopting measures to counter it, it would be 
convenient if the CCCTB proposal were to echo the anti-
abuse rules suggested by the OECD in the same context.23 
Another weakness of the CCCTB proposal, as noted 
earlier in section 3., is its limited scope of application. 
Given that only fiscal groups with consolidated turn-
over above EUR 750 million will be obliged to apply it, 
transfer pricing methods will continue to be necessary 
and will continue to create obstacles to cross-border eco-
nomic activity. The definition of fiscal group included in 
the proposal does not make things any easier. According 
to this definition, it would be perfectly possible for one 
or more entities directly or indirectly connected with the 
parent company of the group, taking part in the develop-
ment of its economic activity under the same conditions 
as group members, to be not formally regarded as part of 
such a group in applying the CCCTB Directive. Conse-
quently, transactions between the group and these kinds 
of related entities must be evaluated according to transfer 
pricing methods.24 
21. In line with economic theory, the demand for goods and services is 
something that exclusively depends on the market. In contrast to assets 
and labour, therefore, this factor is not under a company’s control.
22. The same would happen, so that the example would be equally valid, if 
the group had an affiliated company in the state of destination.
23. See OECD/G20, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Estab-
lishment Status – Action 7: 2015 Final Report (OECD 2015), Interna-
tional Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
24. The same idea has been expressed by M.J. Weiner, Formula Apportion-
ment in the European Union: A Dream Come True or the EU’s Worst 
Nightmare?, CESifo Working Paper 667, pp. 6-7 (2002). 
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Apart from the possibilities of manipulation associated 
with the transfer pricing system, under this new regime, 
incentives would exist to force transactions between the 
group and related entities (that are not formally part of 
the fiscal group) for the sole purpose of changing the loca-
tion of the factors included in the formula. The European 
institutions, therefore, would have to confront a dual 
problem: on the one hand, the possible manipulation of 
transfer prices in order to shift profits from one state to 
another and, on the other, the use of these kind of trans-
actions to divert assets, labour and sales to those compan-
ies that, apart from being resident in low-tax locations, are 
excluded from the scope of application of the CCCTB pro-
posal. Since the number of transactions between groups 
and related entities could be high, EU Member States 
and tax administrations could face serious problems in 
keeping these practices under control.
Due to this concern, the possible manipulation of the 
factors included in the apportionment formula could 
prevent the CCCTB proposal from achieving its goals and 
becoming an effective tool in the fight against aggressive 
tax planning strategies. Taking, as a starting point, the 
fact that the assets factor, and to a lesser extent the labour 
factor as well, is mobile in nature, and therefore open to 
manipulation, perhaps the European institutions should 
reconsider the adoption of an apportionment formula that 
does not make use of these factors. In this sense, a feasible 
alternative to counter aggressive tax planning strategies 
in the EU context would consist in a formula exclusively 
based on sales but measured by consumption.25 Despite 
the weaknesses of this alternative, it should be taken 
into consideration that value added tax is a harmonized 
tax in Europe. Establishing a link between value added 
tax and corporate income tax would imply, at least, two 
important advantages: firstly, the opportunity to employ 
a wide range of location rules for sales and services that 
are already defined and consolidated and secondly, the 
chance to benefit from synergies and economies of scale in 
terms of administrative control. Additionally, the reduc-
tion in the number of factors would allow companies 
and tax administrations to save resources (both time and 
money) and would help to reduce the risk of tax evasion.
25. Concerning this proposal, see E. López Llopis, Formulary apportion-
ment in the European Union, 45 Intertax 10, pp. 638-640 (2017), Kluwer 
Law Online Journals.
The major inconvenience of using a formula exclu-
sively based on sales is that a company’s profits would be 
assigned to the state where goods and services are con-
sumed, rather than the territories where they have effec-
tively been earned. In this way, the suggested alternative 
would require renouncing one key element of the CCCTB 
proposal. Taking into consideration the extensive advan-
tages this alternative would bring about, however, it should 
not be dismissed off hand. 
4.  Conclusions
It is anticipated that implementation of the CCCTB 
proposal in the EU context will help to eliminate 
many of the tax obstacles that currently disrupt the 
correct functioning of the internal market. As some 
experts have warned, however, the application of a 
formula will not definitively put an end to aggressive 
tax planning strategies in the EU context.
Although the CCCTB proposal includes a series of 
anti-abuse rules in order to prevent companies from 
developing manipulation strategies, the experience 
of other countries using formula apportionment 
leads the author to question the effectiveness 
of the proposal in combatting the problem of 
aggressive tax planning in the European context. 
Furthermore, its limited scope of application would 
oblige a great number of cross-border groups to 
continue using transfer pricing methods. Therefore, 
problems associated with this valuation system will 
continue to exist and create obstacles to the correct 
functioning of the internal market.
As far as the author is concerned, there is no doubt 
that the transfer pricing regime should be replaced 
by a more effective system to fight manipulation 
and aggressive tax planning. However, designing an 
adequate method requires taking into consideration 
three essential aspects: (i) the experience of other 
countries with formula apportionment; (ii) the 
distinctive features of the European Union as a 
political unit; and (iii) the opportunities that being a 
part of such a union provide. 
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